Finally Checkpoint changed the way how objects are stored with the R80 release. This release is only running management, wonder when the gateways will be available.
Installed this version in a VMware ESXi 5.5 environment with not problems, at the moment it is running with 3Gb of memory at that is not enough. The swap is already used for 35% and it is only running the Gaia portal, management – and log server no active connections from Smart Console users or logging from gateways.
Check Point R80 release notes.
Well-known cryptography professor Matthew Green has discovered a new SSL vulnarability.
Diffie-Hellman key exchange is a popular cryptographic algorithm that allows Internet protocols to agree on a shared key and negotiate a secure connection. It is fundamental to many protocols including HTTPS, SSH, IPsec, SMTPS, and protocols that rely on TLS.
We have uncovered several weaknesses in how Diffie-Hellman key exchange has been deployed:
- Logjam (CVE-2015-4000) Attack against the TLS Protocol. The Logjam attack allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to downgrade vulnerable TLS connections to 512-bit export-grade cryptography. This allows the attacker to read and modify any data passed over the connection. The attack is reminiscent of the FREAK attack, but is due to a flaw in the TLS protocol rather than an implementation vulnerability, and attacks a Diffie-Hellman key exchange rather than an RSA key exchange. The attack affects any server that supports DHE_EXPORT ciphers, and affects all modern web browsers. 8.4% of the Top 1 Million domains were initially vulnerable.
- Threats from state-level adversaries. Millions of HTTPS, SSH, and VPN servers all use the same prime numbers for Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Practitioners believed this was safe as long as new key exchange messages were generated for every connection. However, the first step in the number field sieve—the most efficient algorithm for breaking a Diffie-Hellman connection—is dependent only on this prime. After this first step, an attacker can quickly break individual connections.We carried out this computation against the most common 512-bit prime used for TLS and demonstrate that the Logjam attack can be used to downgrade connections to 80% of TLS servers supporting DHE_EXPORT. We further estimate that an academic team can break a 768-bit prime and that a nation-state can break a 1024-bit prime. Breaking the single, most common 1024-bit prime used by web servers would allow passive eavesdropping on connections to 18% of the Top 1 Million HTTPS domains. A second prime would allow passive decryption of connections to 66% of VPN servers and 26% of SSH servers. A close reading of published NSA leaks shows that the agency’s attacks on VPNs are consistent with having achieved such a break.
VENOM (Virtualized Environment Neglected Operations Manipulation)
CVE-2015-3456, is a security vulnerability in the virtual floppy drive code used by many computer virtualization platforms. This vulnerability may allow an attacker to escape from the confines of an affected virtual machine (VM) guest and potentially obtain code-execution access to the host. Absent mitigation, this VM escape could open access to the host system and all other VMs running on that host, potentially giving adversaries significant elevated access to the host’s local network and adjacent systems.
Exploitation of the VENOM vulnerability can expose access to corporate intellectual property (IP), in addition to sensitive and personally identifiable information (PII), potentially impacting the thousands of organizations and millions of end users that rely on affected VMs for the allocation of shared computing resources, as well as connectivity, storage, security, and privacy.
What products are affected:
- The bug is in QEMU’s virtual Floppy Disk Controller (FDC). This vulnerable FDC code is used in numerous virtualization platforms and appliances, notably Xen, KVM, and the native QEMU client.
- VMware, Microsoft Hyper-V, and Bochs hypervisors are not impacted by this vulnerability.
- Since the VENOM vulnerability exists in the hypervisor’s codebase, the vulnerability is agnostic of the host operating system (Linux, Windows, Mac OS, etc.).
- Though the VENOM vulnerability is also agnostic of the guest operating system, an attacker (or an attacker’s malware) would need to have administrative or root privileges in the guest operating system in order to exploit VENOM.
Discovered by Jason Geffner, CrowdStrike Senior Security Researcher
Source: CrowdStrike Venom
Fixes: Venom Exploit Fix
October’s POODLE attack affected CBC-mode cipher suites in SSLv3 due to SSLv3’s under-specification of the contents of the CBC padding bytes. Since SSLv3 didn’t say what the padding bytes should be, implementations couldn’t check them and that opened SSLv3 up to an oracle attack.
We’re done pretty well at killing off SSLv3 in response to that. Chrome 39 (released Nov 18th) removed fallback to SSLv3 and Chrome 40 is scheduled to remove SSLv3 completely. Firefox 34 (released Dec 1st) has already removed SSLv3 support.
We’re removing SSLv3 in favor of TLS because TLS fully specifies the contents of the padding bytes and thus stops the attack. However, TLS’s padding is a subset of SSLv3’s padding so, technically, you could use an SSLv3 decoding function with TLS and it would still work fine. It wouldn’t check the padding bytes but that wouldn’t cause any problems in normal operation. However, if an SSLv3 decoding function was used with TLS, then the POODLE attack would work, even against TLS connections.
This was noted by, at least, Brian Smith on the TLS list () and I was sufficiently cynical to assume that there were probably more instances of this than the old versions of NSS that Brian cited, and so wrote a scanner for the issue.
Unfortunately, I found a number of major sites that had this problem. At least one of whom I had good enough contacts at to quickly find that they used an F5 device to terminate connections. I contacted F5 on October 21st and they started working on a fix. Yngve Pettersen also independently found this issue and contacted me about it around this time.
Read more, the original post from ImperialViolet
Check with the excellent functionality from Qualys SSL Labs if you have a weak SSL setup.